In policy settings, interest groups often hold polarized preferences. Since only one policy can be implemented, two outcomes are possible. In the first, both agents agree to negotiate and reach a compromise, reducing the risk of an unfavorable policy. In the second, negotiations fail, and agents choose to compete, accepting the risk that the other’s preferred policy prevails. We propose an experiment to study how individuals behave in such environments, specifically their decision to compromise or compete when paired with an opponent holding an opposing policy preference. Conceptually, compromise is modeled as a two-period bargaining game (Ståhl, 1972; Rubinstein, 1982), while competition is represented by a Tullock contest (Tullock, 1980). If both players choose to compromise, a joint policy is implemented with certainty. If either opts out, the alliance collapses and the winner of the contest determines the final policy. This framework implies a threshold level of risk aversion above which individuals prefer compromise to competition.
The study includes two between-subject treatments. In the first, participants choose between a Tullock contest and a fixed compromise representing a safe, guaranteed joint outcome. In the second, they choose between a Tullock contest and a bargaining process, where the policy outcome and division depend on strategic interaction. Theoretical parameters are calibrated so that risk-neutral players are indifferent between compromise/bargaining and contest. Thus, any behavioral deviation from equilibrium predictions reflects psychological or social forces such as fairness, reciprocity, or the perceived value of cooperation. This design allows us to test how individual risk preferences influence willingness to compromise versus compete and whether the structure of compromise—fixed or negotiated—affects that choice. By linking behavioral decision-making under risk to political conflict and negotiation, the study helps explain when polarized actors reach agreements, when they escalate to conflict, and how institutional mechanisms can promote cooperation and reduce costly deadlock.
This paper, co-authored with Saumya Deojain, is a work in progress.
We study inter-group Tullock contests where there are two possible group types that are heterogeneous in the incentives they face, and players only know the probability their opponent is a particular group type. In the theory and complementary experiment, we compare three sources of heterogeneity – differences in cost-of-effort, prize value, and group size – and vary whether players have complete or incomplete information over the incentives facing their opponent. From the experiment, for the cost and value treatments, we find that incomplete information increases effort relative to uneven (i.e., asymmetric) complete information contests; for group size treatments, incomplete information has no effect. Observed effort is systematically higher than what a theory based on self-interest predicts; this is especially true for group size contests. An extended theory model that incorporates in-group altruism provides a potential explanation for major deviations between the data and standard theory predictions, including the finding that group-level effort increases with group size. Subjective probabilities over the opponent’s type and bounded rationality provide potential explanations for a key result not predicted by the extended theory models.
This paper, co-authored with Hieu Nguyen and Christian Vossler, was presented at the 6th Contests: Theory and Evidence conference, ESA Global 2020 meetings and the 90th annual meeting for the SEA. Here is the published version.
Researchers deploying stated preference surveys to elicit monetary valuations for public goods commonly use techniques devised to reduce bias in hypothetical choice settings. This practice is at odds with evidence that most survey respondents perceive that their decisions have economic consequences. We examine three bias reduction procedures in both hypothetical and incentive compatible, real payment settings: cheap talk, solemn oath, and certainty adjustment. We confirm that adjusting hypothetical choices based on response certainty or using a solemn oath can reduce hypothetical bias. In the incentive compatible decision setting, the oath increases willingness to pay (WTP), and certainty adjustment can lead to serious distortions in demand estimates. Cheap talk does not alter mean WTP but leads to a stark difference in WTP across sexes. To minimize unintended consequences, our results suggest that survey researchers should deploy screening questions to better target these hypothetical bias reduction techniques.
This paper, co-authored with Christian Vossler, is scheduled to be presented at the ESA 2021 North American meeting and the 91st annual meeting for the SEA. Here is the working paper.
This paper, co-authored with Manvi Gupta, is a work in progress.
This paper, co-authored with Srijita Ghosh, is scheduled to be presented at the REECAP Meeting, 2023, University of Warsaw. Here are the slides.
This study examines the effects of using non-binding, exogenous team goals on worker effort in a weakest-link team production game. The experimental design varies the team goal (and whether a goal is present) and task complexity level (simple or complex), lending itself to identify a causal effect of complexity on goal effectiveness. Further, the design also varies goal difficulty (easy, moderate and difficult). Preliminary findings suggest that using team goals can alter production, but relationships between goal difficulty and production are not monotonic. While an easier goal reduces individual production, a rather challenging, difficult goal has no impact relative to no goal. At the same time, only a difficult goal seems to improve team production relative to no goal. A non-binding goal also helps minimize wasted performance thereby enhancing within-group coordination. There is evidence that easy goals may discourage individual production but at the same time this is not true for team production, i.e., effects differ when it comes to the weakest-link worker. Interestingly, when complexity increases i.e., higher cognitive costs are placed on individuals, the magnitude by which difficult goals increase team production is relatively smaller as goal difficulty increases. Further, as task complexity increases, while physical effort decreases, cognitive effort increases. Outcomes from the study are expected to highlight the types of goals managers should set based on the amount of cognitive load a task places on individuals in a team, and therefore this research has important managerial implications.
Here is the working paper.
Given the increasing demand pressure on water resources coupled with supply holdups and institutional failures, fresh-water resources are increasingly susceptible to depletion and add to water stress in India. A vast demand-supply gap necessitates water conservation, including recycling measures. India has a great potential in wastewater treatment, and one of the ways to address it is via decentralization of wastewater treatment given its environmental benefits. This study involves use of a stated preference survey to estimate urban households' willingness to pay for Operation & Maintenance costs of a local Wastewater Treatment Plant (WWTP) supplying treated water for toilet-flushing to residential complexes in Delhi. We find that if freshwater prices rise sufficiently for consumers, they may be willing to subsidize a decentralized WWTP to cover at least the costs of their non-potable water uses. In addition, the co-provision of such public goods can become an important supplement to urban municipal finance.
This paper, co-authored with Sukanya Das, was presented at 4th Water Research Conference by IWA, University of Waterloo and Elsevier. Here is the published version.