Incentives, goals and task complexity: Studying the effects of non-monetary incentives on team performance

This study examines the effects of using non-binding, exogenous team goals on worker effort in a weakest-link team production game. The experimental design varies the team goal (and whether a goal is present) and task complexity level (simple or complex), lending itself to identify a causal effect of complexity on goal effectiveness. Further, the design also varies goal difficulty (easy, moderate and difficult). Preliminary findings suggest that using team goals can alter production, but relationships between goal difficulty and production are not monotonic. While an easier goal reduces individual production, a rather challenging, difficult goal has no impact relative to no goal. At the same time, only a difficult goal seems to improve team production relative to no goal. A non-binding goal also helps minimize wasted performance thereby enhancing within-group coordination. There is evidence that easy goals may discourage individual production but at the same time this is not true for team production, i.e., effects differ when it comes to the weakest-link worker. Interestingly, when complexity increases i.e., higher cognitive costs are placed on individuals, the magnitude by which difficult goals increase team production is relatively smaller as goal difficulty increases. Further, as task complexity increases, while physical effort decreases, cognitive effort increases. Outcomes from the study are expected to highlight the types of goals managers should set based on the amount of cognitive load a task places on individuals in a team, and therefore this research has important managerial implications.

"Bargain or Battle? Experimental Evidence on Conflict and Compromise"

In policy settings, interest groups often hold polarized preferences. Since only one policy can be implemented, two outcomes are possible. In the first, both agents agree to negotiate and reach a compromise, reducing the risk of an unfavorable policy. In the second, negotiations fail, and agents choose to compete, accepting the risk that the other’s preferred policy prevails. We propose an experiment to study how individuals behave in such environments, specifically their decision to compromise or compete when paired with an opponent holding an opposing policy preference. Conceptually, compromise is modeled as a two-period bargaining game (Ståhl, 1972; Rubinstein, 1982), while competition is represented by a Tullock contest (Tullock, 1980). If both players choose to compromise, a joint policy is implemented with certainty. If either opts out, the alliance collapses and the winner of the contest determines the final policy. This framework implies a threshold level of risk aversion above which individuals prefer compromise to competition.

The study includes two between-subject treatments. In the first, participants choose between a Tullock contest and a fixed compromise representing a safe, guaranteed joint outcome. In the second, they choose between a Tullock contest and a bargaining process, where the policy outcome and division depend on strategic interaction. Theoretical parameters are calibrated so that risk-neutral players are indifferent between compromise/bargaining and contest. Thus, any behavioral deviation from equilibrium predictions reflects psychological or social forces such as fairness, reciprocity, or the perceived value of cooperation. This design allows us to test how individual risk preferences influence willingness to compromise versus compete and whether the structure of compromise—fixed or negotiated—affects that choice. By linking behavioral decision-making under risk to political conflict and negotiation, the study helps explain when polarized actors reach agreements, when they escalate to conflict, and how institutional mechanisms can promote cooperation and reduce costly deadlock.